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NOTES
WOBBLING ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS:
THE SUPREME COURT'S FAILURE IN LOTUS
V. BORLAND
"The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."' Out of this constitutional power came the federal
copyright2 and patent' laws granting limited proprietary rights to
those who hold a valid copyright or patent. While the distinction
between the two forms of intellectual property rights is generally
obvious," the creation of computer software has blurred that
distinction significantly.
Computer software is both expensive and useful. Its unique, dual
nature of expression and usefulness has caused great confusion
throughout the legal community. The underlying written computer
code for software provides the expressive aspect because of its
inherent literary nature. Certain words and symbols carry
significance that any author could appreciate. This code, however,
is also a useful process; it causes the computer to perform specific
functions. Because both of these elements are present in software,
I U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2 17 U.S.C. I§ 101-1101 (1994).
3 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376 (1994).
' Copyrights generally apply to an "expression" of a particular idea, but not to the idea
itself or a process behind the idea. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). Patents, however, protect the
process or invention as long as it is new and useful. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). In most
conventional cases, courts have no trouble deciding if patent or copyright applies to the
subject matter because the difference between a useful process or invention is clearly
separate from the expression of an idea.
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the creator can now obtain both copyright and patent protection for
his software.5
As the use and ownership of computers increased, and as
programs became more complex, many theories emerged on the
proper form of protection that should be afforded to software.
Copyright was the original method of protection, but its scope was
relatively limited at the outset. Not until the landmark case of
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.6 did the scope of
copyright protection for computer software begin to expand. Some
commentators now argue that patent law, not copyright law, is the
most effective protection for software and should be the sole form
of protection.7 Although the courts originally declined to apply
patent law to computer software,' they have increasingly upheld
software patents since the Supreme Court's decision in Diamond
v. Diehr.9
As the courts and scholars continue to debate over which of the
two traditional forms of intellectual property is best suited to
protect computer software, a proposal for a new type of intellectual
property protection has become popular. This new form would be
a legal hybrid designed to reach a compromise between copyright
and patent law. 10 It would combine various elements of both
" See Willis E. Higgins, Technological Poetry: The Interface Between Copyright and
Patents For Software, 12 HASTINaG COMM. & ENT. L. J. 67 (1989) (explaining cooperative
protection provided by both copyright and patent and arguing that a combination of these
two traditional forms of property rights is sufficient protection such that a new legislative
right is unnecessary). See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of
the new right.
* 714 F.2d 1240, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 113 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033
(1984); see infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
' John M. Griem, Jr., Note, Against a Sui Generis System of Intellectual Property for
Computer Software, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 145 (1993); Higgins, supra note 5.
a See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (1972) (landmark
case holding computer programs to be little more than standard mathematical formulas
(algorithms) and therefore not protectable under patent laws, as patent laws did not cover
laws of nature or mathematical formulas).
' 450 U.S. 175, 709 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1981). Copyright, at least in 1992, remains the
most widely used form of protection for software. Patents are gaining acceptance but are
still used less frequently than copyrights. John C. Phillips, Note, Sui generis Intellectual
Property Protection for Computer Software, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 997, 998 (1992).
0 Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1329 (1987); Phillips, supra note 9; J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific
Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research,
[Vol. 4:77
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traditional forms of intellectual property in order to protect the
unique, dual nature of computer software. This sui generis"
system would be the sole protection necessary for software and
would render the copyright-patent debate moot.
The Supreme Court recently had a golden opportunity to render
obsolete much of the debate over which form of intellectual
property should govern software. When it granted certiorari from
the First Circuit to hear the controversial Lotus Development Corp.
v. Borland International, Inc.,12 many lawyers, professors, develop-
ers, and the like, in the intellectual property field, eagerly awaited
a clarifying decision.'" The decision, however, left most sorely
disappointed. In a split opinion with one justice abstaining, the
Court merely affirmed the First Circuit holding 4 with a one-
sentence bench decision."' The Court provided no policy, no
reasoning, and no guidance as to the proper role of copyright in the
realm of software protection. 6
This Note will argue that the Supreme Court should have denied
copyright protection to Lotus's software and that it should have
laid down affirmative principles to establish a proper role for
copyright in the software industry. Also, the Note will explain the
ramifications of the Court's failure to provide guidance for future
software protection. Part I will provide an historical development
of intellectual property as applied to software. Part II will analyze
42 VAND. L. REV. 639 (1989); Pamela Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual
Property: Applying the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV.
471 (1985). This new hybrid, which proponents would tailor to fit computer software only,
will not be discussed in detail. It is simply a proposed replacement for copyright and patent
protection for computer software, not a system designed to work in conjunction with them.
" Sui generis literally means "of its own kind or class; i.e., the only one of its own kind."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990). The sui generis right would have to be
created by the legislature, not the courts.
12 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995).
" See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Amicus Curiae Brief of
Copyright Law Professors, Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) (No.
94-2003) [hereinafter "Amicus Brief"] (advocating non-use, or at least restricted use of
copyright protection for software).
14 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1014 (1st
Cir. 1995) [hereinafter "Lotus 1].
" Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) [hereinafter "Lotus 11"].
Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision, so the Court split 4-4.
" Id. The opinion simply stated, "[tihe judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit is affirmed by an equally divided Court." Id.
19961
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the First Circuit's decision denying copyright protection and explain
the failure of the Supreme Court to resolve the issue itself. Part III
will argue that the Court correctly affirmed the First Circuit, but
that it also should have clarified the ambiguities left by the lower
court's opinion by setting a workable definition of copyrightable
expression. Finally, Part IV will detail the possible effect of the
Court's failure to render an effective precedent.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SOFTWARE PROTECTION
The power of Congress to issue copyrights, as noted earlier,
comes from Article I of the Constitution.17 Congress acted on this
constitutional grant in establishing the first Copyright Act in
1790.18 Although the first Act was extremely limited in scope, 19
subsequent Acts continued to expand on what a valid copyright
could protect.20
The landmark case of Baker v. Selden21 explains the difference
between an idea, which is not copyrightable, and the expression of
that idea, which is copyrightable. Selden was the owner of a
registered copyright on his book, Selden's Condensed Ledger, or
Book-keeping Simplified.' This book introduced a new method of
accounting, including drawings and sketches that accompanied and
explained the textual expression.' Selden also obtained copy-
" "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science
and useful Arts.' " Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 325 (1954).
1s Copyright of Books Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, repealed by Act of April 29, 1802,
ch. 36,2 Stat. 171. See also Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of The United
States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROPERTY L. 1 (1994) (in-depth analysis of law developed
from power granted in U.S. Constitution "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts
' It applied only to "any map, chart, book or books already printed .... " Copyright of
Books Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. at 124.
20 See, e.g., Law of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §
101-1101 (1994)) (modified preceding Act to include "all writings of an author.' Id. at 1076).
21 101 U.S. 99 (1879). This is the authority for the idea-expression dichotomy on which
the majority in Lotus I rests its decision. While the First Circuit does not rely on Baker as
a direct analogy, the majority found its reasoning persuasive. Lotus 1, supra note 14, at 816.
2 Baker, 101 U.S. at 99-100.
2Id. at 100.
[Vol. 4:77
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rights for all improvements and additions to the book in an attempt
to protect his new system.2' When Baker published his own
accounting books using substantially the same ledger system that
Selden introduced, Selden filed suit alleging an infringement on his
copyright.25
The court ruled that Selden could protect his expression of the
idea so that no one else could reproduce his books of explanation,
but such protection did not extend to the method of accounting
itself.2' "[W]hilst no one has a right to print or publish his book,
or any material part thereof.., any person may practise and use
the art itself which he has described and illustrated therein.
27
The Court stated that letters-patent would be the only potential
form of protection (if any were allowed at all), but did not examine
a patent claim.28
Courts have long struggled with this idea-expression dichotomy
as it applies to computer software-and for good reason. For, as
will be demonstrated, the line between an idea and its expression
is a very hard one to draw in the world of complex computer
software.
A. THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE
The question as to how to protect computer software was
relatively insignificant until the advent of personal microcomputers
and mass-produced software in the 1970s.' In 1976, Congress
enacted a new Copyright Act giving protection to "original works of
24 Id.
Id. at 100-101.
2' Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879).
" Id. at 104. To see how this early policy applies to software, note the discussion by the
Lotus I court, laid out in part II.B., infra.
" Baker, 101 U.S. at 105.
" Vance Franklin Brown, Comment, The Incompatibility of Copyright and Computer
Software: An Economic Evaluation and a Proposal for a Marketplace Solution, 66 N.C. L.
REV. 977, 979-80 (1988). Even during the increase in computer usage throughout the 1970s,
the question over how to protect software was easy to answer: use copyright. "[M]ost of the
software community viewed copyright as the only form of intellectual property protection
available for software." Higgins, supra note 5, at 74 (citing Committee Reports, 1986 A.B.A.
SEC PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. 262). Thus copyright was the dominant protection
used by software developers.
1996]
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authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."3° The Act
provides protection where works can be "perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device."3 However, subsection (b) of the Act limits the
protection to exclude "any idea, procedure, process, system, [or]
method of operation .... 32 While the Act itself says nothing
about computer software, the legislative history shows that the Act
was intended to extend coverage to the relatively new medium.'I
Congress was indeed concerned that copyright, under the descrip-
tion in subsection (a), might be applied to the processes within a
program, so it included subsection (b) in an attempt to prevent such
an extended scope of protection.'
Congress added two basic changes to the Act of 1976. These
changes, recommended by the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), 35 were
30 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102, 1976 U.S.C.CAN. (90 Stat.) 2544
(current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994)).
31 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (emphasis added). The emphasized language would suggest that
a computer program, as long as it qualifies as a literary work (per § 102(aXl)) is clearly
copyrightable. Most courts have ruled that a software program is a sort of literary work
because of its written code. See, e.g., Lotus I, supra note 14, at 817; Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033
(1984).
32 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
33 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659. "[N]ew expressive forms-electronic music, filmstrips, and computer programs, for
example-could be regarded as an extension of copyrightable subject matter Congress had
already intended to protect, and were thus considered copyrightable from the outset without
the need of new legislation." Id. at 5664.
" Id. at 5670. Subsection (b) of the Act was included to ensure that the methodology of
or used in running the program would not be afforded copyright protection. Only the literal
writing of the code would receive protection under the Act, consistent with prior law (namely
Baker v. Selden). That code is the "literary" element subject to protection.
"CONTU was created in 1974 to address and respond to concerns about the impact of
newer technology on existing copyright laws. One of the goals of this commission was to
recommend any specific legislation that would adequately protect software developers.
Brown, supra note 29, at 984. However, one commissioner dissented from the recommenda-
tions where a program "is capable of being used to control computer operations." NATIONAL
COMWN ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 2 (1978) (reprinted
in 3 COMPUTER L. J. 53 (1981)) [hereinafter "CONTU Final Report']. Because most programs
do control computer operations, this dissent demonstrates exactly the problems courts have
in attempting to apply copyright law. The First Circuit, in its Lotus I decision, appears to
rely on this dissent as the basis for its decision. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
Even with this dissent and CONTU's acknowledgment of the difficulty, the fact that
6
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adopted in the 1980 Amendments" in order to clarify the scope of
the 1976 Act.37 The first change adds a definition of computer
program: "A 'computer program'is a set of statements or instruc-
tions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to
bring about a certain result.' The second change, which is far
less significant for purposes of this Note, allows an owner of a copy
of copyrighted software to make copies or changes for his own
use.
39
These two changes were based on the following four policy
statements:
(1) Copyright should proscribe the unauthorized copying
of these works.
(2) Copyright should in no way inhibit the rightful use
of these works.
(3) Copyright should not block the development and
dissemination of these works.
(4) Copyright should not grant anyone more economic
power than is necessary to achieve the incentive to
create. °
While the language of the statute clearly seems to protect only
the literal expression of a program, distinguishing between the
program's expression and its underlying processes, methods of
Congress merely incorporated the CONTU recommendations into the existing Copyright Act
rather than a separate section or act shows that copyright was (and still is) the preferred
method of protection. The new recommendations merely narrow the scope of protection.
" This was called the Computer Software Copyright Act. Brown, supra note 29, at 984.
The inclusion of computer software in the Copyright Act shows that copyright was still the
preferred method of protection. Development of the scope of that protection, however,
remained in the hands of the courts, as shown by the lack of "computer software" among the
laundry list in § 102(a).37 H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CX-N.
6460, 6482.
38 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
39 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994). This section adds express approval for reverse engineering and
other fair use capabilities in connection with Judge Boudin's dissenting opinion in Lotus
I, discussed at part II.E., infra.
"' Gregory J. Ramos, Lotus v. Paperback Confusing the Idea-Expression Distinction and
Its Application to Computer Software, 63 U. CoL. L. REV. 267, 270 (1992) (citing CONTU
Final Report, supra note 35, at 12).
1996]
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operation, and systems proved difficult for the courts. At the
outset, courts followed the legislative mandate by separating the
functional from the merely expressive aspects of computer soft-
ware.41 Courts would not allow copyright to protect any functional
elements. If a function contained even some expressive elements,
the functional aspect precluded copyright protection for the
expressive parts of that fimction.'3
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.43 marked the
beginning of the expansion of copyright protection." Since that
decision, courts have gradually expanded the scope of copyright
protection beyond a program's code. In addition to protection
against the copying of a program's underlying code, copyright began
to offer protection against the nonliteral "copying of a program's
overall structure, sequence, organization, and even its manner of
operation."'
In 1986, the Third Circuit, in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, Inc., handed down a highly controversial
opinion concerning the copyrightability of computer software. 4
4 1See Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 199 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 537 (N.D. Tex 1978) (holding that expression that cannot be separated from its
underlying idea is not copyrightable). The judge in this case used an analogy to the 'figure-
H" configuration of a gear box in an automobile. Judge Higginbotham reasoned that any
expression of the design, such as a manual, diagram, etc., is protectable through copyright.
However, the designer may not prevent a manufacturer from utilizing the figure-H in its car,
or from using any variation thereof. Society should be able to benefit from the new design
and build upon it for constant improvement. Id. at 1013.
" "An expression through which a user controls the underlying process is not protected
by copyright, regardless of the number of ways the control can be expressed." Ramos, supra
note 40, at 272 (analyzing figure-H analogy from Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013).
4 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (holding that
computer operating system programs are not necessarily precluded from copyright
protection). Franklin copied the Apple II object code so that its ACE 100 model would be
compatible with Apple programs and compete with Apple in general-the ACE 100 could
then run the same programs.
That object code made up the program that actually ran the computer and caused it to
perform whatever functions the software "told" it to perform. Object code is the "machine
language" in binary code, distinct from the source code that computer programmers use to
write the software. Source code is much easier for humans to read and is much easier to
classify as expression.
"Brown, supra note 29, at 986.
"Id. at 987.
4797 F.2d 1222, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031
(1987).
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The allegedly infringing program in that case did not "copy" any
elements of the original's code. Instead, the overall structure of
the program was the same as the original. The court determined
that the new program nevertheless violated the copyright on the
original software. 7
The Whelan court ruled that the purpose of the program
constitutes the idea behind it.'" Copyright protection can then
extend to all elements of the program that are "not necessary to
[that] purpose."' 9 The court's definition of expression included
"the manner in which the program operates, controls and regulates
the computer in receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining,
correlating, and producing useful information either on a screen,
print-out or by audio communication.' s
This new view of what constitutes copyrightable expression
marked the extension of copyright to the "look and feel"51 of a
computer program. Such expansion meant that not only would a
program that substantially copies an original's code violate a
copyright, but any program that uses the same (or substantially
similar) format, operation, or structure as an original would violate
that copyright.52
The decision in Whelan seems contrary to the holding in
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., where the
court ruled that the sequencing and ordering of data for input
"' Id. A software developer created a custom program to keep records for a dental
laboratory. The lab then developed a similar overall program in a different program
language and then began to market the new version on its own.
48 Id. at 1236.
' Id. The reasoning must follow that if the purpose constitutes an idea, anything that
is not absolutely necessary to the purpose would simply be an expression of the idea. The
expression itself can be protected by copyright, but the ides cannot.
'0 Id. at 1239. As pointed out in Brown, supra note 29, at 988, this definition seems to
ignore 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). That section forbids copyright protection to processes and methods
of operation. In allowing copyright to protect the second program in Whelan, the Third
Circuit focused too much on rewarding the developer for his efforts. While that is one
consideration underlying copyright policy, the more important consideration is promoting the
public good. That is best achieved by allowing programmers to build on each other's work.
This building policy is the major theme underlying this Note' s position against copyright
for Lotus 1-2-3 in Lotus v. Borland.
' Brown, supra note 29, at 995 (citing Davidson, The Whelan Decision: Missing the
Middle Ground, 5 COMPUTER L. REP. 335, 337 (1986); Russo and Derwin, Copyright in the
'Look and Feel" of Computer Software, COMPUTER LAW, Feb. 1985, at 1).
82 Brown, supra note 29, at 993.
1996]
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formats were inseparable from the underlying idea or purpose.'
The Whelan court attempted to distinguish Synercom on the basis
that the dispute in the latter case only involved input formats
(which are essential to the program) while the former was con-
cerned with the structure and sequence of the program in its
entirety."
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc. , was decided
later in the same year as Whelan and involved virtually the same
situation as presented in Synercom. In Broderbund, however, input
instructions appeared on the screen, whereas the input formats in
Synercom were in a printed manual. Each set of input instructions
served the same purpose-both helped the user enter data properly
so that the programs could perform their respective fimctions.6
Even though the case was factually similar to Synercom, the
Broderbund court found copyright infringement because the
programs were substantially similar. Adopting the reasoning of
Whelan, the Broderbund court held that a software developer "must
express the idea [of its rival program] through a substantially
different structure."57
The decision in Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software
Internationals marked the height of broad copyright protection.9
That case involved facts very similar to Lotus I: another spread-
sheet program, "VP-Planner," was created to be fully compatible
with Lotus 1-2-3 so that no retraining or rewriting of macros would
'Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013. That court posed the rhetorical question: "If
sequencing and ordering is expression, what separable idea is expressed?" Id.
"797 F.2d at 1239. The difference must lie in that the overall structure is merely an
expression and arrangement of the idea, whereas the sequencing and ordering of the input
formats are an inherent part of the idea and not just an expression of it. The distinction is
a weak one and has caused confusion in later cases, as many courts decided not to adopt the
Whelan analysis. See, e.g., Plains Cotton Coop. Assn. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc.,
807 F.2d 1256, 1262, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987)
(expressly declining to follow Whelan).
"648 F. Supp. 1127, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 700 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
wId. at 1132.
67 Id. at 1133.
5740 F. Supp. 37, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (D. Mass. 1990).
9See Ramos, supra note 40, at 267 ("[Virtually every aspect of a computer process is
[now] a copyrightable expression.").
[Vol. 4:77
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be necessary.' Paperback developed this new software without
using Lotus code, but fully intended to copy the basic structure of
the user interface."' Judge Keeton held the user interface to be
protectable by copyright.62 This development marked a further
expansion from Whelan. In Paperback, the court prohibited
programs that produce a similar function as an original, even
where the program does not copy the original's underlying, written
code. 63
Finally, the Second Circuit, in Computer Associates International
v. Altai, began to restrict the newly expanded scope of copyright
protection. It did so by introducing a test to determine substantial
similarity between a copyrighted program and its alleged infring-
er.' The court broke down its analysis into three steps: abstrac-
tion, filtration, and comparison.' Abstraction means breaking the
original program down into its various structural parts.66 Filtra-
tion requires a determination of which parts are protectable as
expression and which are inseparable from the idea expressed. 7
' Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 69. For a definition of "macro" and a factual statement of
the Lotus I case, see, infra, part IIA.
1d.
s Id. at 68. Paperback never attempted to hide the fact that its interface was identical
to Lotus's. Rather, it used that fact to its own advantage as part of its advertising and
boasted that VP-Planner operates the same way as Lotus 1-2-3 so that the user would not
have to learn anything new to do all the same things. VP-Planner just cost a lot less. Id.
at 69.
l' Id. Later cases, namely Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693 (2d Cir. 1992), addressed this issue of literal-nonliteral copying. See infra, Part III.B.
"Altai, 982 F.2d at 706. The test, often referred to as the Altai test, applies when there
is nonliteral copying, that is, when the later software does not copy exactly from the original.
Rather, the copy is more of a "paraphrase" that still yields the same results as the original.
The paraphrase does not have to be in the object or source code (although those are two
elements); it can be in any other aspect of the program as well, e.g., the visual display or
general organization.
" Id. at 706-11. This three-step analysis has been warmly received by courts and
commentators. See, eg., Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d
1335,31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (5th Cir. 1994); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35
F.3d 1435, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1086 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995);
Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1503 (10th
Cir. 1993); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1015 (Fed Cir. 1992). Even the Lotus I court acknowledged the appropriateness of the
test given the right context. Supra note 14, at 814.
so Altai, 982 F.2d at 706.
67 Id. at 707.
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Comparison then involves comparing those protectable parts to the
allegedly infringing program." If there is substantial similarity
between significant protected elements, the latter program
infringes on the original's copyright." Applying this test, the
Altai court affirmed the district court's finding of no infringement
and emphasized that "copyright infringement cases... that involve
computer programs are highly fact specific."
70
Even with the general acceptance of the Altai test, courts still
vary in their application of that test as well as in their application
of other copyright policies.7' Unfortunately, none of the many
available tests truly seems to fit the wide array of programs on the
market. This multiplicity of judicial approaches testifies to the
confusion that still surrounds the copyrightability of computer
programs.72 To clear up this confusion, the Supreme Court
needed to set some clear and authoritative guidelines for determin-
ing the proper scope of copyright protection for computer software.
Because the Court failed to take advantage of the opportunity in
Lotus v. Borland, copyright doctrine in this area remains as murky
as ever.
B. THE RISE OF PATENTABILITY
Patents were initially rejected for computer software, primarily
because of the judiciary's misunderstanding about what a
computer program really i8.73 Patents have never been permitted
to protect "laws of nature, mathematical formulas, abstract ideas,
or other fundamental truths."74 The Supreme Court applied this
Id. at 710.
69Id.
70 Id. at 715.
71 Such other policies include merger, scenes A faire and fair use. All of these will be
discussed in Part III of this Note.
7' Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 2308, 2349 n.150 (1994) (citing Whelan, Lotus I, Paperback,
and Gates as decisions offering different tests that could all apply, but that are not
sufficiently tailored to suit software needs).
73 Griem, supra note 7, at 147, 163-67. The chief misconception was that a computer
program is nothing more than a combination of mathematical formulas. By following this
line of thought, judges "completely discounted the painstaking human effort and the
patentable innovation that went into creating the conversion algorithm.* Id. at 164.
7" Brown, supra note 29, at 981.
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principle in Gottschalk v. Benson75 to deny patent protection for
a computer program. 76 The court held that an algorithm is a type
of mathematical formula, which is not patentable, and, since the
computer program is based on a series of algorithms, the program
was not patentable either.7 s
In 1981, the Court revisited the issuance of patents for computer
software after gaining a more sophisticated view of the subject
matter. The landmark decision of Diamond v. Diehr" finally
permitted patent law to encompass software. The Court recognized
that programs are not simply algorithms standing alone (which,
like any other mathematical formula, would not be patentable);
rather, they are inventions that utilize algorithms to perform tasks
designed by the programmer.80 The requirements for patent
protection are met "when a claim containing a mathematical
formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or
process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a
function which the patent laws were designed to protect."
Although initially hesitant about issuing software patents,' the
Patent and Trademark Office has gradually become more comfort-
able with its authority over software.' Many intellectual property
experts strongly advocate patent rather than copyright protection
for computer software because of its closer fit to the utilitarian
nature of software."
75 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (1972).7 Id. at 71-72.
7Id. at 72.78 Id. at 72.
7 450 U.S. 175, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1981). It is important to note that Diamond did
not overrule Gottschalk. The Gottschalk Court simply held that the particular program at
issue was not patentable and specifically left the door open for future patent protection of
computer software. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71.
80 Id. at 192-93.
' Id. at 192.
' "Even a favorable later decision, Diamond v. Diehr.... has not alleviated completely
the [Patent and Trademark Office's] reluctance to issue patents for computer programs."
Phillips, supra note 9, at 1022.
83 Software Industry in Uproar Over Recent Rush of Patents, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1989,
at Al.
See, e.g., Griem, supra note 7; Higgins, supra note 5.
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C. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Because patent law is designed to protect the very utilitarian
nature of programs that copyright law cannot address, the fact that
both are used for the same medium inevitably leads to conflict
between the two areas of law. The scope and use of copyright
protection for software seemed to expand while patents were still
uncommon. Copyright offered a quicker and easier solution than
patent law because patents were far more difficult to obtain.86
Despite the hardships encountered in obtaining a patent, such
protection was still an attractive option because, "in exchange for
the difficulty in obtaining patent protection..., patent law grants
a monopoly."" Such monopolistic power can motivate developers
to apply for patents more frequently than they otherwise would. 7
Patents eventually gained acceptance in the courts and with the
PTO." Copyright, however, maintained its presence in the
software industry, and an overlap developed between the two forms
of protection. Theoretically, such an overlap should not occur due
to the distinct nature of each type of intellectual property: patents
protect useful inventions, whereas copyrights only protect expres-
sions of those ideas. 9 As courts recognized this conflict and the
inherent usefulness of even the most expressive programs, they
began to restrict the scope of copyright to its pre-Whelan level of
8 Copyrights are relatively easy to obtain through a simple, inexpensive registration
process. Higgins, supra note 5, at 69. The person seeking a copyright for his work need only
submit an application, 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1994), and a copy of the work to be protected, 17
U.S.C. § 408(bX1) (1994).
Patents, on the other hand, require a much more tedious and expensive process. More
specific requirements must be met with respect to originality, 35 U.S.C. § 102, and
obviousness, 35 U.S.C. § 103. The total process (as of 1987) generally takes about two or
three years to complete. Higgins, supra note 5, at 70-71 (citing Comm'r. of Patents and
Trademark Ann. Rep. at 21 (1987)).
M James W. Morando & Christian H. Nadan, Proprietary Rights: Do Software Patents
STAC' the Deck Against the Competition?, 11 COMPUTER LAW. 1, 3 (April 1994).
87 If a developer can obtain a monopoly over a certain market, then he could profit
handsomely. That would make the effort and expense of the application process for patents
worthwhile. Id.
" See part I.B., supra.89See discussions, supra parts 1.- and I.B.
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protection.90 Still, the newly restricted scope was unacceptable
because, as discussed earlier, courts did not apply the law uniform-
ly.91
The decision in Lotus v. Borland could have proven monumental
by finally defining a limited scope of copyright protection for
computer software. Such a limiting decision would have allowed
subsequent expansion of patent protection for software or might
have opened the door for the development of a sui generis system
of protection of computer programs. The Supreme Court could have
returned the law to a state where copyright protection once again
applied to nothing in the software but the actual code or other
purely expressive feature of the software. The First Circuit took a
big step in that direction by recognizing that even the expressive
aspects of software may be uncopyrightable as methods of opera-
tion. The Supreme Court, however, failed to seize the opportunity
to establish some firm guidance on the proper scope of copyright
protection as applied to computer software.
II. LOTUS V. BORLAND: THE CASE AND DECISIONS
A. FACTS
Lotus had been the market leader92 in computer spreadsheet
programs with its popular software, Lotus 1-2-3." A user oper-
ates the program by using commands designed to perform specific
functions (print, save, etc.)." Each of these commands is con-
tained in a menu or submenu such that the user need only select
the command from the menu directly with the cursor keys or
90 Ramos, supra note 40, at 274 (citing Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture
Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987), which
declined to follow Whelan and others that modified the Whelan rule).
" Courts did not apply rules consistently. Some applied the Whelan-Broderbund policy
and others modified them according to individual cases. See, e.g., Engineering Dynamics,
Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding user interface is
copyrightable only to extent that it reflects non-functional judgment). But see Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Paperback Software Intl, 704 F. Supp. 57 (D. Mass. 1990) (allowing copyright for
user interface as whole).
"Microsoft Excel is now the undisputed leader in spreadsheets.
9Lotus did have a valid registered copyright for protection of Lotus 1-2-3.
94 Lotus I, supra note 14, at 809.
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mouse, or type a corresponding letter as indicated in the menu.95
Rather than go through each menu and submenu with different
commands individually to perform one final fumction, a user can
write a "macro" that will combine a series of commands into one
keystroke for faster operation.9 Macros essentially allow the user
to customize the program for his own efficiency.
Borland is a competitor of Lotus with its own spreadsheet
software, Quattro and Quattro Pro. These two programs were
designed to be far superior to Lotus 1-2-3 with many functions that
were not available on Lotus's program. In order to attract users
who were already accustomed to using Lotus 1-2-3, Borland
included an option in Quattro and Quattro Pro that displayed" 'a
virtually identical copy of the entire 1-2-3 menu tree.' "97 In
providing this display that looked like the Lotus menu structure,
Borland used its own code, not simply a copy of the Lotus code.9,
Importantly, however, Borland did copy exactly the observable
words and structure of Lotus L-2-3 so that Lotus 1-2-3 users would
be able to use Quattro or Quattro Pro without having to learn a
new system of menus and commands. Borland even titled this
Quattro feature the "Lotus Emulation Interface.'
Because the command hierarchy was the same, Borland also
enabled Quattro to read previously written Lotus macros. Not only
would users save time by operating the software based on the same
96Id.
" Id. Many programs allow users to write macros to simplify use of the software. They
are generally for functions that a user performs often. For example, word processor users
may create a macro for certain letterheads to start different documents so that one action
brings up a particular heading rather than having to type and format from scratch every
time.
" Id. at 810 (quoting Judge Keeton in Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl, Inc., 831 F. Supp.
202, 212, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (D. Mass 1993)). This "menu tree" is the menu
command hierarchy that is the focus of the court's opinion. By "command hierarchy," the
court is referring to the structure of the menus and commands within the menu. For
example, if a menu were to contain the commands "copy," "save," and "print," with each one
of those commands calling up a submenu, and so on, that would be a command hierarchy.
Borland's code is considered by most to be superior to the Lotus code. It runs the
program more efficiently, among other things, and is one of the reasons that Quattro Pro is
the better software.
"Lotus I, supra note 14, at 810. This feature was removed after the district court's
summary judgment in favor of Lotus, but the commands and structure remained the same,
simply without the visual reproduction of Lotus 1-2-3. Quattro maintained compatibility
with Lotus 1-2-3 and could still read and run macros written for Lotus software.
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system, they would not even have to rewrite their macros. Quattro
does offer many other features that Lotus does not, and users do
not have to use the Lotus interface if they do not choose to do so.
A Quattro user who does not operate on Lotus commands may use
Quattro's own commands and command structure.
Lotus filed suit against Borland only four days after it won its
decision in Paperback. There the District Court of Massachusetts
held the user interface to be copyrightable expression because it
involved a choice of words and arrangement of those words on the
screen." The district court, following its ruling in Paperback,
found the Lotus menu command hierarchy to be copyrightable
expression.101 Therefore, in copying that command hierarchy,
which was an integral part of the Lotus 1-2-3 software, Borland
infringed Lotus's valid copyright as a matter of law."°
The First Circuit disagreed. The court ruled that the menu
command hierarchy is not merely an expression, regardless of the
test applied to determine whether there was literal copying of the
Lotus program."° The command structure as a whole cannot be
copyrighted in the first place because it is a method of opera-
tion.1°4 Thus the First Circuit reversed Judge Keeton's decision
based on the prohibition against copyright protection for a method
of operation as set out in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)."°
B. THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS
Borland asserted in its defense that the menu command hierar-
chy is exactly the sort of uncopyrightable method of operation
" Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 68-70 (D. Mass. 1990).
Judge Keeton, who presided over Paperback, also presided over Lotus's new action against
Borland.
101 The lower court held that "[a] very satisfactory spreadsheet menu tree can be
constructed using different commands and a different command structure from those of Lotus
1-2-3. In fact, Borland has constructed just such an alternate tree for use in Quattro Pro's
native mode. Even if one holds the arrangement of menu commands constant, it is possible
to generate literally millions of satisfactory menu trees by varying the menu commands
employed." Lotus I, supra note 14, at 810-11 (quoting district court, Lotus Dev. Corp. u.
Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203, 217 (D. Mass. 1992)).
102 Lotus I, supra note 14, at 811 (quoting lower court in Lotus, 799 F. Supp. at 223).
103 Id. at 816.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 819.
1996]
17
Grout: Wobbling on the Shoulders of Giants: The Supreme Court's Failure
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1996
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
intended to be excluded under the Copyright Act of 1976.'06
Because Borland conceded that it had copied the command
structure, the only issue for the court was whether or not that
structure could be classified as an "expression" or as a "method of
operation." 10 7 Because Paperback was a district court decision, it
had no precedential value to the Court of Appeals and left the
Lotus I court "navigating in uncharted waters."" s
One key distinction that separated Lotus I from other cases
concerning copyright protection for software was that it dealt with
a different issue. In any copyright infringement suit, a plaintiff
must satisfy a two-prong test originally established by Justice
O'Connor in Feist: "(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2)
copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.""~
Whereas most prior software copyright cases assumed a valid
copyright and simply addressed the question of copying, the First
Circuit focused on the valid copyright prong of the Feist test." °
The First Circuit was thus one of the first courts to challenge the
presumption that copyright could protect any expressive element of
computer programs."'
In finding that Lotus's copyright was invalid, the First Circuit
first concentrated on separating method from expression. The court
6 ld. at 815 (referring to 17 U.S.C § 102(b)).
107 Lotus I, supra note 14, at 812.
'
08 Id. at 813. The court recognized the dicta of Autoskill, Inc. v. National Educ. Support
Systems, Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1495 n.23, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1829 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 916 (1993), that avoided the "method" issue by applying the "minimal degree of
creativity" standard, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275 (1991), to uphold the copyrightability of a keying procedure in a
learn-to-read program. The court first ruled Autoskill inapplicable, Lotus I, supra note 14,
at 813, but then declared it inconsistent and incorrect to the extent that it was at odds with
Lotus I-the keying procedure used for the program must be a method of operation. Id. at
818-19.10 9 Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.
11o Lotus I, supra note 14, at 815. Examples of cases merely addressing the copying prong
of the Feist test are Computer Assoc. Int'l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992);
Autoskill, 994 F.2d at 1495; Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37
(D. Mass. 1990).
. The court considered using the Altai test, but stated that focusing on copying would
keep the "real* issue in the background. In this type of case, the court should turn its
attention toward a determination of whether the work is even copyrightable from the outset,
not whether another program might infringe. Thus it is an issue for the court, not for the
jury. Lotus I, supra note 14, at 815.
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did not deny that the menu command hierarchy is expressive;
rather, the court determined that it is a method of operation for the
program that forces the otherwise protectable expression into the
realm of § 102(b). 112  Thus, even though the menu command
hierarchy is expressive and would normally be protectable, the fact
that it is also a method of operation renders it unprotected by
copyright law.
In finding that the command hierarchy is a method of operation,
the First Circuit employed an analogy to the buttons (and labels on
the buttons) of a video cassette recorder (VCR)." 3 Even though
the buttons of a VCR might arguably be expressive in the way they
are laid out on the face of the machine, or in the choice of labels on
them, they are still necessary for a user to operate the VCR." 4
If the user wishes to play a cassette, he must press the button
marked "play." Similarly, if a Lotus user wishes to print a
document, he must highlight the "Print" command or type the letter
"P.""' That is the computer equivalent of pushing a VCR
button."l 6
The commands themselves are the essential part of the Lotus 1-
2-3 software and entirely different from the labels on a VCR's
buttons. 1 7 The court emphasized this point because the labels
themselves may be a copyrightable expression. On a VCR, the
labels for the buttons merely provide guidance to the user by
indicating which buttons to press. Even if unlabeled, though, the
buttons would still operate the VCR. Thus, the buttons are the
112 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). The court elaborated on this point, explaining that "[tihe
'expressive* choices of what to name the command terms and how to arrange them do not
magically change the uncopyrightable menu command hierarchy into copyrightable subject
matter." Lotus I, supra note 14, at 816.
' Id. at 817. In doing so, the court rejected Borland's attempt to analogize the case to
Baker v. Selden. Id. at 814. Borland compared the T-accounts of Selden's accounting
system to the command structure of Lotus 1-2-3. Its argument was that both were input
functions (Selden's on paper, Lotus's on the screen). The difference, according to the First
Circuit, was that Lotus merely claimed protection over its expressive choice of commands, not
over the entire structure of spreadsheet programs in general (Selden had claimed protection
for the general structure of his T-account system).
114 Id. at 817.
115 Id.
116 Lotus I, supra note 14, at 817.
117 Id.
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functional part of the VCR while the labels are purely expres-
sive.1
18
Conversely, a user could not perform a computer equivalent of
pressing the button without a command.119 The command itself
is more than an expression of a function; it is the function (the
command operates like the actual button, not just the label). In
other words, the expressive element is inseparable from the
functional element. The court indicated that if Lotus had somehow
designed its software with the terms on the interface acting merely
as labels, such terms might have been copyrightable under
traditional software copyright analysis." However, the com-
mands are not mere labels-the exact terms are necessary to
perform the desired functions. Removing the command would
remove the function, unlike removing the label from the button of
a VCR.12' Software commands serve the same purpose as the
VCR's actual buttons: operating the software. As such, the
commands are part of the structure's method of operation."2
In addition to using the VCR analogy to deny copyright coverage
to Lotus's interface, the First Circuit also adhered to the policies
behind copyright protection."2 According to the court, the Copy-
right Act should "encourage others to build freely upon the ideas
and information conveyed by a work."12' To hold that Borland
had infringed a valid Lotus copyright in this case would run
contrary to that policy and Congressional intent behind § 102(b).
Borland, and others, would not be able to use Lotus's ideas to
create better, more sophisticated and efficient software. By
denying this ability to build on a previous developer's ideas,
copyright would not truly "promote the Progress of Science and
"a Id.
119 Id.
' See, id. While the court did not say this directly, it made a significant effort to
distinguish such a case. Because the visual terms would then merely be guides rather than
essential to the operation of the software, they would no longer fall under the method-of-
operation exception. Hence, under the Paperback user interface analysis, a court may find
the "labeling" terms to be protectable by copyright.
1
1 L
otus I, supra note 14, at 817.
1nId,
in Id. at 818.
124 Id. (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991)).
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useful Arts.""2 The First Circuit thus acknowledged that most
successful programs derive from programmers who stand "on the
shoulders of giants." 2
C. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari, many intellectual
property professors and practitioners from around the country
hoped for a monumental decision. Lotus v. Borland would repre-
sent the first case of its kind before the Court.127 Many people
had already seen the First Circuit decision as a potential (and
actual) landmark case to refine the role of copyright in the ever-
increasing world of computer usage.' 28 In a single case, Lotus
presented many of the controversial issues of copyright law with
respect to computer software."2 Even if the Court were to decide
not to follow the First Circuit's analysis, at least it could settle the
confusion over the proper role of copyright protection. Unfortunate-
ly, the Supreme Court disappointed everyone with its decision.
On January 16, 1996, only months after deciding to hear the case
on certiorari, the opinion came down: "[t]he judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is affirmed by an
equally divided Court.... Justice Stevens took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case." "8° No explanation accom-
panied this message, nor did any of the Justices write separately.
The First Circuit opinion simply stood as it was.
'
25 Lotus I, supra note 14, at 818 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
* This phrase comes from Isaac Newton's famous statement: "If I have seen farther
than other men, it is because I have stood on the shoulders of giants." When applied to
computer programming, this refers to "building" on prior works. Programmers build on the
creations of those who come before them. These original creators are the giants who provide
the boost for those who can improve the creation.
12 Only circuit courts and Congress have addressed the copyrightability of computer
software. The Supreme Court has only addressed software in the patent context as discussed
in part I.B., supra.
2S Many of the top academics and lawyers in the United States prepared and submitted
an Amicus Curiae brief to the Court in favor of a restricted role for copyright. Amicus Brief,
supra note 13.
' Namely, the case involved the focus on the first prong of the Feist test, a rejection of
copyright based on § 102(b), a sound means of determining a method of operation, and a
rejection of the Altai Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison test.
*' Lotus II, supra note 15, at 804.
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Perhaps the only good part of the holding was simply a happen-
stance of the four-four split: affirming the judgment in favor of
Borland. While the menu command hierarchy (and user interface
in general) should not be copyrightable, many reasons exist to
explain why. The Supreme Court's failure to issue a full decision
leaves the circuits in disarray over the proper resolution of several
important issues regarding the copyrightability of computer
software.
Indeed, this Note has already discussed some of those unsettled
issues. When should a court apply the Altai test (or a variation
thereof)? The First Circuit applies it only in cases of nonliteral
copying, but other circuits attempt to apply the test even in cases
of literal copying. What can be copyrighted at all? How functional
must an expressive element be before copyright will no longer
protect the work? Is the First Circuit's VCR analogy helpful in
determining whether other aspects of computer software fall under
§ 102(b)? The Supreme Court left all of these questions unan-
swered. The balance of this Note will demonstrate that Lotus v.
Borland presented the Court with the opportunity to resolve
several important issues. It will also explain how the Court should
have decided, or at least set up guiding principles for deciding, each
issue.
III. MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
Although the First Circuit's main holding in Lotus I simply
declared a menu command hierarchy an uncopyrightable method
of operation, the case also raised many of the controversial issues
that confront software copyright cases. The fact that so many
issues were present in a single case made it perfect for a Supreme
Court decision that addressed each one. Indeed, the Court could
have set forth proper tests for copyrightability, where necessary,
and eliminated the use of doctrines that should not apply to
software.
The First Circuit raised five issues in its opinion that the
Supreme Court could have addressed. First, the First Circuit
distinguished cases that merely separate ideas from expression and
declared that copyright may not cover even some expressive
[Vol. 4:77
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elements when those elements are also methods of operation.1 1
Second, the First Circuit considered the Altai test, but rejected it
for use in this type of case (where expression is not relevant
because it is still a method of operation)."3 2 Third, the court
mentioned the useful article exception for sculptural works but did
not apply it in the decision because a computer program is a
literary work."3 The exception, however, raises the possibility of
applying the merger doctrine to deny copyright protection, as many
courts have done in connection with the idea-expression analysis.
Fourth, the First Circuit noted that certain commands and terms
in spreadsheets are "stock" commands that, if covered by copyright,
would defeat the principles of copyright law.1" Those principles
are embodied by the doctrine of scenes A faire such that the
Supreme Court could have passed on it along with the merger
doctrine and the Altai test. And finally, in the concurring opinion,
Judge Boudin raised the possibility of privileged use applying to
computer software because of the inherent "building" process that
spawns better, more efficient programs."3 This Part of the Note
will address each of the five issues in turn.
A. METHOD OF OPERATION TEST
The only issue on Lotus's appeal to the First Circuit was
whether the menu command hierarchy was a copyrightable
expression."13 As a result, the First Circuit did not have to
address a general infringement claim and could focus strictly on the
question of whether copyright law protects one particular aspect of
the computer program: the menu command hierarchy.
In rejecting the application of the Altai test to such a specific
aspect of the program,137 the First Circuit focused its initial
1
3
1 Lotus I, supra note 14, at 818.
1 2 Id. at 814-15.
13 Id. at 817.
134 d. at 815.
135 Id. at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring).
" Lotus I, supra note 14, at 813. Borland conceded that Lotus had a valid copyright in
the spreadsheet program as a whole.13
' Because the Altai test has been applied differently in many cases, it will hereinafter
be referred to as the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison test, except where there is specific
reference to the actual Altai application. The following section will further explain the
adoption of that test and its proper application to copyright infringement cases involving
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inquiry on the issue of protectability. With the proper factual
setting, a court may more efficiently address the issue of protecta-
bility at the outset rather than rely on the cumbersome abstraction-
fitration-comparison analysis."s The fact that only one element
of the program was at issue presented the First Circuit with such
an opportunity but did not justify its decision to disregard com-
pletely the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison process.13 The
ultimate conclusion that the menu command hierarchy is uncopy-
rightable is correct. However, the analysis leading to that conclu-
sion-that the menu command hierarchy is a method of opera-
tion-while true, is not entirely satisfactory. The Supreme Court
thus had an opportunity to set forth a more clear-cut framework for
a proper initial analysis.
The command hierarchy truly is a functional aspect of the Lotus
1-2-3 program, as the analogy to VCR buttons and labels indicates.
As such, copyright law should not protect it from use by other
programmers. "[Any person may practise [sic] and use the art
itself which [the author] has described and illustrated therein."4 °
Arguably, the command hierarchy is a guide to the art of spread-
sheet programs as the T-accounts illustrated by Selden were a
guide to that accounting system. For this reason, the analogy
advanced by Borland is applicable, and the First Circuit should
have taken it under consideration.""
Ruled lines and account headings, as illustrated in Selden's
book, are functional because they were made to be used by others.
computer software.
" Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 833 (10th Cir. 1993).
139 The Court should have performed at least the abstraction-filtration process. Because
Borland did copy the hierarchy, no comparison would be needed. Again, this will be
discussed more thoroughly in the following section.1
,
0Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879) (emphasis added).
1
,
1 Borland argued that the only difference between Selden's T-accounts and the menu
commands is that the " 'user interface' of Selden's system was implemented by pen and
paper rather than by computer." Lotus I, supra note 14, at 814. Judge Stahl rejected this
claim because of the difference in claims: Selden claimed protection of his entire accounting
system; Lotus only claimed protection over its "expressive" choice of commands. Id. The
fault in this logic is that Selden claimed protection of his actual T-accounts--those illustrated
in his book. But because they are simply input functions, as Borland asserted, they were
held unprotectable by copyright, even though it was a new expression and organization of
material. Similarly, Lotus cannot claim protection of its functions, even though they are
arranged in a new expressive fashion.
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Generally, illustrations can only be embodied in concrete forms,
namely wood, metal, stone, or some other physical form. For
example, an illustration of a bird house would be embodied by the
actual bird house after being built. The fact that Selden's
illustrations can only be embodied by further drawings does not
change the fact that they are functional guidelines for accounting,
useful beyond their value as a mere illustration. "IT]he principle
is the same in all."" 2 And the principle is the same if the ius-
tration or diagram is embodied on the screen of a computer.
Even assuming the rejection of the Baker v. Selden analogy, the
First Circuit could have analogized programming to industrial
design to reach the same conclusion. Perhaps such a comparison
would create less confusion than the analogy to VCR labels."
The only difference between programming and industrial design is
that programs (and their features) are based on text rather than
physical machinery.'" The position and placement of a trigger
on a mechanical drill could possibly be expressive, but it is a useful
method for operating the drill. It performs its function because of
the machinery supporting it. Similarly, a command menu, while
expressive, is also a useful method for operating the spreadsheet.
It performs its function because of the text of the source and object
code. Neither the drill trigger nor the command menu is copyright-
able, regardless of its expressive qualities."
No matter which analogy it might have chosen, the Supreme
Court could easily have concluded that the menu command
hierarchy is a method of operation. In addition to the First Circuit,
the court in Mitek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Engineering Co.'" found
that the menu structure of the program at issue was a process and
thus not copyrightable. 147 In creating a useful method of opera-
tion, the author "must seek patronage and protection from its
'
2 Baker, 101 U.S. at 105.
" The Amicus Brief to the Supreme Court stated that one of the major problems with
the First Circuit decision was that it did not do a good job of distinguishing method from
expression. Amicus Brief, supra note 13, at 16.
"'Samuelson et al., supra note 72, at 2327-28.
'"This is clearer when considered in connection with the merger doctrine, discussed in
part IH.C., infra.
140 864 F. Supp. 1568, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
147 id. at 1580.
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utility to the public, and not as a work of science."'" At least, by
affirming the First Circuit opinion, the Supreme Court properly
held the menu command hierarchy to be uncopyrightable. What it
also did, however, was affirm other problems in the decision by
oversimplifying copyright analysis. It placed too much emphasis on
the method of operation exception to the exclusion of other
important doctrines.
B. PROPER APPLICATION OF THE ALTAI TEST
Courts have readily accepted the use of the Abstraction-Filtra-
tion-Comparison test in computer infringement cases. 49 Exactly
how to apply it, however, is not so apparent."W The circuit courts
cannot agree on when to apply the test. Some limit its use to cases
concerning nonliteral copying only, while others apply the test even
in cases that involve literal copying. 5'
A further problem in the application of the test is that the courts
cannot agree on the distinction between literal and nonliteral
copying. Judge Stahl declared that the First Circuit was "faced
with Borland's deliberate, literal copying of the Lotus menu
command hierarchy."'52 He conceded, however, that Borland did
not copy any of the Lotus 1-2-3 underlying code."5 The problem
with that analysis is that literal copying usually refers to copying
148 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1879). This means that patent law, if any, is the
only appropriate law for protecting even an expressive method of operation.
'4 See supra note 65 (giving examples of the warm embrace).
150 'Court decisions are, generously described, in a state of creative ferment concerning
the methods by which nonliteral elements of computer programs may be identified and
analyzed for copyrightability." Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26
F.3d 1335, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994).
"" Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1545, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (11th Cir.
1996). That court cites Lotus I to illustrate an example of a court that refused to apply the
analysis to a situation that it considered literal copying. Id. The district court in the
Bateman case also limited the test to cases involving nonliteral copying. Id. at 1544
(providing excerpt of district court's opinion). That limitation was one of the primary
reasons the case went up to the Eleventh Circuit on appeal. Id. at 1543-44. The district
court, in Mitek v. Arce also confronted the problem and acknowledged the confusion: it
looked back to Gates (which expanded on the Altai test) and determined that Gates only
applies to literal copying. Mitek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng'g Co., 864 F. Supp. 1568, 1578
(S.D. Fla. 1994).
Lotus I, supra note 14, at 814 (emphasis added).
'
3Id. at 810.
[Vol. 4:77
26
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol4/iss1/5
LOTUS V. BORLAND
the code. For example, the Bateman court questioned application
of the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison test because that case
involved literal copying: Mnemonics had admitted to copying
portions of the code." Similarly, the Mitek court found the test
applicable to "literal aspects of the program, i.e. the source code
and object code because it does not manifest itself visually."'5
The confusion over when to apply the Altai test clearly demon-
strates the need for a uniform rule to guide the circuit courts in
their decision making. However, the distinction between literal
and nonliteral copying is really "more of a matter of semantics than
substance."" The Bateman court asserted that the formal test
would certainly apply to nonliteral copying (elements other than
the underlying code), but recognized the need for a similar analysis
when analyzing the code. Still, the court refused to offer an opinion
as to whether the exact same test or evaluation should apply.
157
Because the same question was at issue in Lotus I, where the First
Circuit rejected both the standard Abstraction-Filtration-Compari-
son test and any variation for its method-expression distinction, the
Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the question on
appeal.
1. Why The Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test Should Have
Applied. Although a computer program as a whole falls under the
category of "literary work,"lMs the program can be divided into
different elements. Upon division, the screen display is entitled to
protection as a separate literary work, a pictorial or graphic work,
or an audio-visual work. 159 The screen display itself has several
independent elements, one of which is a menu."6o Because so
154Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1542 (emphasis added).
156Mitek, 864 F. Supp. at 1581.
'"Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1545 (11th Cir. 1996).157 id.
16 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & 1995 Supp.).
' Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application
Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1084 (1989).
" "A 'menu,' in computer parlance, is a graphical user interface employed to store
information or functions of the computers in a place that is convenient to reach, but saves
screen space for other images." Mitek Holdings v. Arce Eng'g Co., 864 F. Supp. 1568 n.11
(S.D. Fla. 1994) (citingApple Computer Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1037 (N.D.
Cal. 1992)). The Ninth Circuit in Apple v. Microsoft found that the menu as a whole is an
idea not covered by copyright, but did not assess the menu command hierarchy, which is a
part of the menu. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir.
1996] 103
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many elements are present on a computer display and can be
arranged in so many different ways, the entire screen or even
elements within the screen could receive copyright protection as a
compilation.16 ' Like a menu, the menu command hierarchy has
individual elements: the commands themselves. In fact, Lotus 1-2-
3 has 469 commands arranged into more than 50 menus and
submenus. 62 Unlike the First Circuit in Lotus I, however, the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that a claim could rest on the unique
selection and arrangement of all the features in the interface.'6
3
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit found that a series of formats, when
taken together as a whole, qualify as an expressive arrangement
where they "do not self-evidently convey only an 'idea.' n164
The Tenth Circuit refused to address the question of protectabil-
ity of menus because the record from the district court was too
ambiguous in explaining what a menu was and how it might
receive protection. 16 Because different interpretations are
possible, and because the circuits appear to remain uncertain about
protecting menus, the Supreme Court could have clarified the issue
in Lotus II. The First Circuit ruled that the menu command
hierarchy as a whole was uncopyrightable, yet focused its analysis
(during the VCR analogy) on the individual commands. It thus
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995).
161 Brown, supra note 29, at 1003. Brown argues that most displays of programs used by
businesses would satisfy the requirements of a compilation under § 101 of the Copyright Act,
including the menu of Lotus 1-2-3. Id. "A 'compilation' is a work formed by the collection
and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged
in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship."
17 U.S.C. § 101. Brown asserts that while this is the correct application of the law, it is one
of the many problems encountered when applying copyright law to computer programs.
Brown, supra note 29, at 1003.
162 Lotus I, supra note 14, at 809.
1 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995). As just explained, the menu command hierarchy can be
broken down into its own sub-elements just like an interface can.
16 Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1344 (5th Cir.
1994). Formats are a part of the program's code, but a similar analysis can apply. While
the court in that case did not address the issue of compilations, the result is the same-a
combination of elements that may be individually unprotectable for whatever reason may
nonetheless receive protection as a whole because of their expressive arrangement.
"' Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 843 (10th Cir. 1993). In defining
"menu," the 10th Circuit cited as an example the definition from the district court in Lotus
v. Borland.
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failed to acknowledge that even if the commands are unprotectable,
there is still a possibility that the arrangement of the commands
and their structure could receive protection.'" For that reason,
the Supreme Court should have analyzed the case through some
sort of Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison test to determine if the
menu command hierarchy, apart from its individual commands,
deserved protection, or at least should have set some guidelines for
a proper determination on remand.
2. Application Of An Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test.
Even though Lotus has a valid copyright on Lotus 1-2-3, and even
if the menu command hierarchy is distinguishable from its
individual commands as a compilation or other "expressive" work,
an application of the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison test should
still render the menu command hierarchy uncopyrightable.
A work that is subject to copyright protection when considered as
a whole may still contain elements that cannot be protected
individually. 16 7  Even though an element of a program may be
thought of as the "look and feel" of a program, and thus considered
expressive, it can only receive protection if another doctrine does
not remove it from the coverage of copyright law. iM Because even
these expressive elements may be unprotectable, they must be
dissected. 169 The arrangement of commands within the Lotus 1-
2-3 menu command hierarchy may be expressive, but because it
may also be within another category excluded from copyright, an
Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison test was certainly appropriate
for use by the Supreme Court. The only question should have been
how to apply it.
'" As stated in Gates, "unprotectable elements of a program, even if copied verbatim,
cannot serve as the basis for ultimate liability for copyright infringement. However, the
copying of even unprotected elements can have a probative value in determining whether the
defendant copied the plaintiffs work." 9 F.3d at 832 n.7. The same principle would apply
even if analyzing one element of the program, such as a menu or menu command hierarchy.
"" Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) ('he mere
fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every element of the work may be
protected").
" Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995). Some of the possible doctrines that would remove the
element from protection are any of the specific characterizations found under 17 U.S.C. §
102(b), merger, scenes A faire, fair use, etc.
" Id. This "dissection" refers to the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison test.
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a. Abstraction. As noted above, the Altai test was the first
application of the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison process.
170
The Tenth Circuit accepted the basic analysis but expanded on it
to set forth affirmative guidelines in its application. 171 That court
also recommended comparing the programs in their entirety before
beginning the dissection. 172  The advisability of such a compari-
son, however, is a subject of considerable debate. 173  Once again,
the Supreme Court had the opportunity to settle a dispute, but
failed to do so.
What is not in dispute is the difficulty of analyzing an individual
claim. When breaking down a work into a series of abstractions,
a court will reach a point somewhere in the series where the
abstraction is not protectable. 74  However, "[nlobody has ever
been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can."175 Although
the line may seem somewhat arbitrary, a court must face its
responsibility and draw the distinctions. 7  Indeed, many courts
have managed to draw the line quite satisfactorily. 177  Courts
should take a case-by case approach 71 in their abstraction analy-
'
7
o See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
1 Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 841 (10th Cir. 1993). The court
specified 6 different levels of generality: (1) the main purpose, (2) the program structure, (3)
modules, (4) algorithms, (5) source code, and (6) object code. Id. at 835. This list is by no
means exhaustive. Of those levels listed, the main purpose is almost always not protectable.
On the other hand, the source code and object code usually are protectable. Id. at 836.
These specific levels of abstraction apply to the underlying, "literal" elements of the software.
The same principles apply to nonliteral elements, but obviously these specific abstractions
do not.
172id.
'
7 3 See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d at 1443 (must determine
questions of what and how much can be protected before considering work as a whole).
... Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). The reason for
reaching such a point is that if all were protectable, the author of the work would be able to
prevent the use of his ideas, not just the expression of them. That would clearly run against
the very nature of copyright protection.
7
" Id. (emphasis added). This famous statement by Judge Learned Hand takes on a new
meaning in its application to computer software. The abstractions from software are much
more complex than normal literary or artistic expression.
176 Id. at 122.
17 7 Amicus Brief, supra note 13, at 24 (noting the success of the Altai, Gates, and Apple
v. Microsoft courts in finding elements unprotectable because of their functionality).
178 Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1343 (5th Cir.
1994) ("Protectable originality can manifest itself in many ways, so the analytic approach
may need to be varied to accommodate each case's facts"); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando
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ses because so much depends on the individual programs, whether
or not copying is admitted, and whether that copying is literal or
nonliteral. The difficulty in the abstraction process should not have
steered the First Circuit away from addressing the issue by
choosing its own method of analysis. Taking notice of the success-
ful efforts of other circuits, the Supreme Court at least should have
required the lower courts in the Lotus case to rise to the challenge
by attempting their own abstraction analysis.
b. Filtration. The filtration process should eliminate ideas,
processes, facts, public domain information, merger material, scenes
A faire material, and any other element that the Copyright Act
specifically excludes from the scope of its protection.'79 The
authors of the Amicus Brief for Lotus II argued correctly that the
Court could clearly filter processes and methods from the program
along with general and abstract ideas."s Thus the First Circuit
was not wrong in concluding that the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command
hierarchy could not be protected as a method of operation-it
merely proceeded under a faulty analysis. The Supreme Court
should have confirmed filtration, and not the analysis adopted by
the First Circuit, as the appropriate test for eliminating uncopy-
rightable material from the scope of copyright protection.
The filtration step applies with equal force to computer screen
displays as it does to useful code language.' Determining what
should be eliminated during the filtration step is, however, subject
Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993) (reaffirming necessity of case-by-case
analysis).
179 Gates, 9 F.3d at 834.
'oAmicus Brief, supra note 13, at 14.
1' See generally Mitek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng'g Co., 864 F. Supp. 1568, 1579-84
(S.D. Fla. 1994) (filtering out 13 of 18 screen elements as unprotectable for various reasons).
As discussed earlier, supra notes 149-156 and accompanying text, the entire Abstraction-
Filtration-Comparison test applies to nonliteral elements, but not simply by examining the
code underlying those elements. As the Lotus I court attempted to explain, the elements on
the screen actually cause the operation of the desired program function by selecting the
proper command. This is particularly so when dealing with a Windows-based program
because then a direct "double-click" on the relevant icon actually activates the program.
Thus, a screen feature may be clearly functional and not subject to copyright protection when
analyzed under this test.
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to each court's own interpretation."z 2 In Apple v. Microsoft, the
court filtered out most of the expressed features because Microsoft
had licensed them from Apple's graphical interface.' In an
older case before the time of computers, the Supreme Court ruled
that the basic symbols that make up a shorthand system were not
copyrightable because they were an inherent part of the shorthand
language. 8 ' The Amicus Brief to the Supreme Court in Lotus v.
Borland argued that the same principle should apply to a set of
computer commands.ls In other words, because commands are
an inherent part of the macro language used to operate the
computer program, those commands and their organization are not
copyrightable. In Ashton-Tate v. Ross,'" the Ninth Circuit denied
protection to a computer software command structure because that
structure was too abstract to be protectable by copyright." 7
These three cases suggest that even if the Lotus 1-2-3 menu
command hierarchy is a compilation separate from the functionality
of the underlying commands, a court would still be justified in
denying copyright protection. Under the principle of Apple v.
'
82 The court must scrutinize each element produced during the abstraction process. In
Lotus I, part of the abstractions would include the commands themselves, apart from their
organized structure.
" Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1176 (1995). Although Apple did not grant Microsoft the authority to duplicate its
entire graphical user interface, it did license most of the features individually. Id. at 1438.
As a result of the filtration process, the court eliminated all of those features that were
licensed in order to compare the two pieces of software for infringement. Id. at 1439. The
result was no infringement. Id.
' Brief English Sys., Inc. v. Owen, 48 F.2d 555, 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 851
(1931). This is analogous to the alphabet itself. Just as the letters are inseparable from
written language, the symbols of a shorthand system are inseparable from that language.
No one would be able to copyright a new word simply because he reorganized the letters in
his own expressive way. Similarly, no one can copyright an element of a shorthand system.
'
8 5 Amicus Brief, supra note 13, at 38 (citing Brief English Systems, 48 F.2d at 555).
1 8 6Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1541 (9th Cir. 1990).
m Id. at 521-22. In that case, the originator of the commands was not the actual
programmer; he had been working on designing a program with the defendant. Id. at 517-
18. The plaintiff had hand written a list of user commands and provided a structure for
their use. Id. at 517. The defendant, however, ended up designing the program without the
aid of the plaintiff, but did incorporate the plaintiffs commands and structure into his
program. Id. at 518. The court refused to find that the list entitled the plaintiff to copyright
protection, not because the commands were functional at that time, but simply because they
were too abstract an idea. Id. at 521-22.
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Microsoft, the Court would have to proceed to the comparison
stage,"' but Brief English Systems and Ashton-Tate suggest that
the Court could immediately eliminate the entire menu command
hierarchy from consideration.'" At the very least, the Court
could eliminate the menu commands themselves before reaching
the comparison stage because the commands clearly are not
entitled to protection standing alone.'90
On the other hand, the Engineering Dynamics court classified the
Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy as purely expressive.'
That court, like the Lotus I court, assumed that the command
hierarchy could be examined as a whole for purely expressive
characteristics. Thus, it also ignored the fact that the menu
command hierarchy can be broken down into further levels of
abstraction. After filtering those lower levels of abstraction, the
examination would be different. Only after that further filtration
can the jury or court continue to the comparison stage.
c. Comparison. In this stage of the analysis, Gates Rubber
explicitly rejects the "total concept and feel" comparison. Such a
comparison is of little value after the filtration stage. "92 In the
case of Lotus 1-2-3 and Quattro Pro, the commands would no longer
be a part of the analysis at this point in the test. Because virtually
every element of the menu command hierarchy is uncopyrightable,
the Court should have also found the structure as a whole uncopy-
rightable. 93
ls Following in the next subsection.
"' Both of these cases suggest an analysis akin to applying the merger doctrine,
discussed in part Ill.C., infra.
"'0 As discussed earlier, the individual commands are functional, abstract, inherent parts
of a language, etc., all of which are not protected by copyright. They are also stock phrases,
as will be discussed with respect to merger and scenes A faire in the next two sections, III.C.
and III.D.
"' Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1344 (5th Cir.
1994). That court agreed with Judge Keeton's findings from the district court level and
stated that the utilitarian nature of the commands does not change the expressive nature
of the structure as a whole. Id. at 1346.
" Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823,839 n.15 (10th Cir. 1993). That
is why the court suggested an examination as to the total concept and feel prior to dissection.
After the unprotectable elements are gone, very little is left to enable the court to get a "feel"
for the total concept. Presumably, those elements providing the concept are functional and
will have been eliminated.
" Although this seems contrary to the purpose of "compilations" under the Copyright
Act, the anomalous result arises because of the dual nature of software-utilitarian and
expressive. The commands themselves are inherently useful, thus any efficient arrangement
will also be useful, even if also expressive. Such a tedious Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison
1996] 109
33
Grout: Wobbling on the Shoulders of Giants: The Supreme Court's Failure
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1996
110 J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 4:77
One additional problem arises in the comparison stage that
would possibly allow Lotus to win its infringement claim: many
courts allow "thin" protection even where virtually every underlying
element or abstraction is unprotectable.1 ' The Engineering
Dynamics court asserted that the same careful approach estab-
lished and adopted by Feist should also apply to cases involving
computer interfaces.1" In such cases, verbatim copying would
still constitute infringement."' Other courts apply an even more
lenient standard in thin protection cases: virtually identical
copying. 97 If the thin protection were to apply, Borland would be
liable for infringement. It not only virtually copied the Lotus 1-2-3
command hierarchy, it copied the feature verbatim,'" thus
satisfying even the stricter standard.
Not all courts, however, apply the thin protection standard. As
the Ninth Circuit stated, "[i]n some circumstances, even the exact
set of commands used by a programmer is deemed functional rather
than creative for the purposes of copyright" and thus would not be
test is not necessary when analyzing more traditional literary works.
1' Thin protection is protection only against verbatim copying. In traditional cases,
"verbatim" has an obvious meaning. In software cases, the troubling distinction between
literal and nonliteral copying arises with respect to whether verbatim copying applies to the
actual code (from the diskettes) or to verbatim reproduction of the visual effects, etc.
'm Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1348 (5th Cir.
1994) (citing district court in Lotus v. Borland, 831 F. Supp. 202, 209 (D. Mass. 1993)). This
allowance for infringement claims based on verbatim copying is particularly useful for
plaintiffs trying to prevent reverse engineering of their programs. In reverse engineering
cases, the new programmer can legally search an existing program for unprotectable ideas
and functions to use, but the process requires the making of an identical copy to break down
into its component parts. Plaintiffs often base their claims on the actual copying because it
is too hard for them to prove protection after the filtration process. David A. Rice, Sega and
Beyond: A Beacon for Fair Use Analysis... At Least as Far as It Goes, 19 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 1131, 1136 (1994). See part III.E., infra, on reverse engineering and its relation to fair
use.
1 Id.
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995) (infringement claim could rest on unique selection and
arrangement of all features in interface with liability attaching for virtually identical
copying); Mitek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Engg Co., 864 F. Supp. 1568, 1584 (S.D. Fla. 1994)
(citing Apple v. Microsoft, 35 F.3d at 1446, and adopting same thin protection with
infringement based on virtual identity).
.. Only the commands and their on-screen structure were copied, not the underlying
code.
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protectable.1 ' The Supreme Court would have been unwise to
allow even thin protection for such a functional aspect of the Lotus
1-2-3 program. Thin protection still limits access to utilitarian
expression, thus preventing other programmers from using even the
most basic expression to design a better product.m Because the
First Circuit did not allow such protection, the Supreme Court, by
its simple affirmation, has not allowed it either. Unfortunately,
neither decision expressly rejects thin protection, and thus it
remains a viable basis for copyright protection.
C. MERGER DOCTRINE
The First Circuit, during its analogy to the buttons and labels of
a VCR, raised the point that if the buttons of a VCR had been
purely expressive in their arrangement, they might still have been
subject to a useful-article exception. 2 1 Judge Stahl, however,
distinguished the commands from buttons because computer
software, unlike VCRs, is defined by the Copyright Act as literary
work.2 02  Although the useful-article exception may itself not
apply, the closely related doctrine of merger should.20 3
199 Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524,24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1561 (9th
Cir. 1992). That court analyzed the code rather than the features of a screen display, but
the same principles apply. The code is generally considered the most expressive aspect of
a program, so if it cannot receive some copyright protection because it is functional, neither
should anything else.
mo Rice, supra note 195, at 1140. The policy rationale behind disallowing protection for
functional elements will be discussed along with merger in the next section.
"0 "A 'useful article' is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not
merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1988 & Supp. 1993).
m2 Lotus I, supra note 14, at 817. The useful-article exception only applies to a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work. 17 U.S.C. § 101. One commentator has argued the contrary,
that a program could be considered a useful article. Phillips, supra note 9, at 1017 (citing
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int', 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990). He explained
that the Paperback court did not apply the exception, however, because Judge Keeton felt
that copyright law had advanced under congressional and judicial developments to preclude
such an application. Id. See also Menell, supra note 158, at 1049-50 (explaining why
literary classification is not sound because of overly broad protection without consideration
of proper application of merger doctrine).
2ms Judge Stahl even noted the concept of merger in relation to the protection of Lotus's
"long prompts"--another feature that was not on appeal. His footnote suggests that the First
Circuit would recognize the merger concept as a defense to infringement: "when merger
occurs, identical copying is permitted." Lotus I, supra note 14, at 816 n.9. But see Apple
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In order for copyright protection to attach to a work, the
expression must be distinct from the idea. "Copyright protection is
denied to expression that is inseparable from or merged with the
ideas, processes, or discoveries underlying the expression. "M
This theory acts as a "prophylactic device" to protect ideas.2°
The dissenting commissioner in the CONTU Final Report obviously
had this principle in mind. He did not like the notion of classifying
computer software as a literary work because programs are similar
to other objects "designated to do work-for example, the cam of a
drill." °9 Allowing such expression to be protectable would insu-
late the ideas from effective use as well.
Some academics argue that merger is not applicable in a case
such as Lotus or other software cases because merger only applies
where the particular expression is "essential" to the underlying
idea, process or function."° Just because some expression is the
best or most efficient does not make it essential for the purpose of
applying a merger analysis; merger applies only where no different
expression is conceivable. 2 '9  However, other academics and
practitioners would not necessarily agree with such a strict
application of merger." Those critics would argue that "the
availability of alternative choices is not by itself a reliable basis for
distinguishing between elements of a program that are expressive
and those that are excludable under § 102(b)."210
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1176 (1995) (recognizing thin protection even if idea and expression are merged; would
prohibit nearly identical copying).
' Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993). That court
applied the merger doctrine in the filtration process of its Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison
test. The Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy's expressive structure could merge with
an idea or process as a whole and eliminate the need for a lengthy formal analysis. Or, as
advocated earlier, the merger doctrine could simply apply when dissecting the command
hierarchy as a compilation in itself.
2M Id.
CONTU Final Report, supra note 35, at 29-30 (Hersey, Comm'r dissenting).
20" Phillips, supra note 9, at 1020 (arguing that merger doctrine is inadequate to protect
ideas in software cases; rather Congress should create sui generis protection with variation
of merger doctrine as one fundamental aspect). But see Menell, supra note 158, at 1100
(advocating new approach to merger doctrine for more closely tailored protection of software
ideas and functions).
' Id. at 1020-21. This suggests that perhaps scenes A faire would be a better approach.
2 0 Amicus Brief, supra note 13, at 37.210id.
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Choices of terms, both in the code and on the screen, more easily
merge with their ideas because of the very nature of software.
Programs compete on the basis of behavior. Whether the source
code or user interface is particularly original or expressive is
irrelevant to the competition: no one truly buys a program for that.
People buy programs and compare them to other programs based
almost solely on how well they operate and how easy they are to
operate.21'
Still, courts may leave the question of merger to a jury and allow
copyright protection to some interface specifications even where the
expressive choices are limited. The jury must simply be informed
as to the constraints on choice and the possible application of
merger principles. 12 Thus, even where the fact-finder determines
that merger does not prevent infringement, it must still consider
the doctrine.213 Menell argues that although copyright law is not
well-suited for protection of computer programs, it can be adapted
for better application. 24  A careful application of the merger
doctrine will help copyright law adapt to software needs because it
will stimulate invention and development of better programs.215
Had the Supreme Court rendered an affirmative opinion in Lotus
II, it certainly could have addressed the issue of merger and set
forth some definitive standards to help tailor the doctrine to the
needs of computer programs. Merger is a judicially-created
"' Samuelson et al., supra note 72, at 2316.
2
' Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1545 (11th Cir. 1996).
" Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 836, 842 (10th Cir. 1993)
(finding doctrine appropriate and holding district court in error for refusing to consider
merger in Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison analysis); Mitek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng'g
Co., 864 F. Supp. 1568, 1582 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (finding that merger applies because of limited
ways to depict three-dimensional plane in design programs).
21, Menell, supra note 159, at 1050 n.20.
216 Id. at 1050. This assertion is based on the assumption that merger will allow for
standardization of certain aspects and elements of software. As an expression becomes the
industry standard, it will then merge with the idea so that even identical copying is always
permitted. But see Phillips, supra note 9, at 1019 (arguing that such application of merger
principles is erroneous because expression becomes protectable when first expressed, with
protection lasting for 75 years; only after it has been protected does it later become industry
standard). Menell would respond by advocating a principle similar to trademark law: give
protection until the new interface becomes the industry standard. That way the originator
has an incentive to create because he will have a market lead until use becomes common.
Menell, supra note 159, at 1101-02.
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doctrine,216 thus the Court could have clarified how it should be
applied to computer cases. In doing so, it could have, and perhaps
should have, followed the guidance advocated by Menell: allow
protection until there are no realistic options left for alternative
expression, then begin to apply the merger principles.
D. SCENES A FAIRE DOCTRINE
A court may "deny protection to those expressions that are
standard, stock, or common to a particular theme or setting."217
This principle is similar to the doctrine of merger and derives from
the Feist decision: if an expression is usual, it lacks the originality
necessary for protection.2 8 Because most courts recognize this as
an inherent limitation on copyrightability, 219 the Supreme Court
could have addressed this in Lotus II as well, particularly because
the First Circuit had noted the stock terms in the menu command
hierarchy such as "copy" and "print."
220
Scenes A faire is particularly applicable in computer cases
because of the constant drive toward standardization among
application programs. 22' Aside from the desire to make programs
more efficient, programmers share a broader goal to make pro-
grams more user-friendly--easier to operate and easier to switch
from one program to another if necessary.222 This is because "[a]
216 There is no statutory definition; it is simply a part of copyright's common law. The
doctrine arises out of the idea-expression dichotomy and is essentially an extension of the
rationale announced in Baker v. Selden. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d
675, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1st Cir. 1967) (expanding on rationale of Baker v. Selden to
introduce what is now known as merger doctrine). "When the uncopyrightable subject
matter is very narrow, so that 'the topic necessarily requires,' ... if not only one form of
expression, at best only a limited number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party
or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future
use of the substance." Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 678 (citation omitted).
217 Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993).
2 1 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (cited in Gates,
9 F.3d at 838, during discussion of scenes A faire).219 See, e.g., Gates, 9 F.3d 823 (recognizing such inherent limitation).
Lotus I, supra note 14, at 815.
22 1 See generally BEN SHNEIDERMAN, DESIGNING THE USER INTERFACE: STRATEGIES FOR
EFFECTIVE COMPUTER INTERACTION (1987) (explaining goals and attempts of programmers
to achieve some sort of uniformity in computer software).
222 Menell, supra note 159, at 1052.
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program that is not easily used is a program that will not be
used."22  Programmers no longer want to create a unique, cus-
tomized design or application. Instead, they use a more method-
ological, engineering approach." This drive toward uniformity
inevitably causes certain specifications that might have been
originally expressive to become stock or standardized.
CONTU overlooked the public desire for standardization when it
prepared its study.' According to a national trade study, 99.3%
considered ease of use as a primary factor in considering what
software to buy.226 Another 86.4% factored compatibility into the
equation.227 Unlike CONTU, however, several courts have al-
ready taken standardization into consideration.s The Court in
Lotus II should also have considered the commands in the menu
command hierarchy, and perhaps the entire structure as a whole,
to be standards in the industry. Most spreadsheet programs have
copied some aspects of Lotus 1-2-3 because it was "the spreadsheet
leader, the state of the art."2'S The Court could clearly have found
the individual commands of Lotus 1-2-3 to be stock phrases and
uncopyrightable for purposes of the Abstraction-Filtration-Compari-
son test. Otherwise it should have remanded the case for a
determination of fact as to whether the command hierarchy has
'3 Ramos, supra note 40, at 277. In order to make programs easier to use, the
programmers strive to achieve five goals in particular: (1) minimize learning time, (2)
maximize speed of performance, (3) minimize rate of user errors, (4) maximize user
satisfaction, (5) maximize users' retention of knowledge over time. SHNEIDERMAN, sUpra
note 221, at 14-15.
Samuelson et al., supra note 72, at 2331.
225 Menell, supra note 159, at 1066.
2m INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, A
COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. SOFTWARE INDUSTRY (1984) at 50 (citing 1984
Software User Survey, SOFTWARE NEWS (1984)). See Menell, supra note 159, at 1066
(advocating standardization in software industry).
227 INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note
226, at 50 (citing 1984 Software User Survey, SOFTWARE NEWS (1984)).
' See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993)
(denying protection where a certain expression is "dictated by external factors," namely
specific software standards and target industry demands); Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v.
Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1347 (5th Cir. 1994) (allowing district court to
consider industry demands and practice on remand); Mitek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng'g Co.,
864 F. Supp. 1568, 1582 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (finding word "cut" to be term of art and
unprotectable under scenes A faire doctrine).
' Brown, supra note 29, at 1004 (emphasis added).
39
Grout: Wobbling on the Shoulders of Giants: The Supreme Court's Failure
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1996
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
become an industry standard, with instructions to find for Borland
if it has.' °
E. PRIVILEGE
Judge Boudin, in his concurring opinion in Lotus I, suggested
that while the position of Judge Stahl was justified, he might prefer
a different analysis. Instead of determining that the menu
command hierarchy is completely unprotectable, Boudin would
allow Borland (and others similarly situated) a privileged use. 23 1
This mode of analysis would allow Lotus to reap the rewards of its
creation by prohibiting other programmers from simply copying
nonliteral aspects and reselling them under their own labels. 2
Yet it would allow companies such as Borland to reap the rewards
of making a better product whose only use for the Lotus menu
structure was to enable the users to build on their own investment
in learning.'m  As Judge Boudin explained, "[Tihe closest ana-
logue [to this allowance] in conventional copyright is the fair use
doctrine."'m
Fair use only applies when the material is copyrightable from the
outset, not when protection is denied. Currently, only cases of
reverse engineering have applied the fair use doctrine to computer
programs.'m  Copying is essential to reverse engineering tech-
niques, and reverse engineering is desirable because it allows
programmers to get to the core functionality of a program. Without
it, the holder of a copyright would be able to protect ideas and
'
0 The same problems discussed in the merger section with respect to initial copyrighta-
bility and a subsequent loss in protection would also be applicable to the scenes & faire
doctrine. This Note suggests adopting an analysis similar to that asserted by Menell, supra
note 159, at 1101. Balancing the incentive to create with dissemination of ideas would best
accomplish the goals of copyright.
"' Lotus I, supra note 14, at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring).
2" Id.
' Id. Boudin explains that users would not choose Borland for the Lotus menu-
otherwise they would choose the program that created the menu, for whom the menu was
designed. Borland's use is simply a fallback option; its success is really due to its other
improvements and new features. Id. at 820.
"
4 Id. at 821.
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843,24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1015 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding it fair use for programmer to reverse engineer program,
including making of exact copy, to find unprotectable ideas for his own use).
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functions that are not otherwise protectable. 2 Only one other
case, Bateman v. Mnemonics, considers fair use in terms of copying
nonliteral elements from a graphical interface. 7  There, the
Eleventh Circuit held fair use to be a factual issue.' Section
107 of the Copyright Act sets out the four factors of a fair use
analysis, 9 but because few courts have applied the doctrine to
computer programs, a fact-intensive application would be very
difficult.
Boudin's suggestion has definite appeal, but even he admits that
it would have its own costs." Certainly the Supreme Court
could have laid some groundwork for such a proposition, but other,
more solid foundations already exist which the Court could have
simply expanded or clarified. The Abstraction-Filtration-Compari-
son, along with the merger and scenes A faire doctrines, would have
been more appropriate areas for the Court's exploration. As it
stands now, however, courts must continue to hash out their own
rulings based on the facts of each individual case, even if that leads
to inconsistent results.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF NON-DECISION
Because the Supreme Court offered no guidance in its opinion
and the First Circuit decision appears confined to a limited set of
circumstances, other circuits have nowhere to turn but to copyright
policy.241  CONTU drew the line between ideas and expression
with the knowledge that drawing it too liberally would grant
monopolies inhibiting improvement while drawing it too conserva-
tively would discourage efforts to create.242 Protecting ideas that
m Rice, supra note 195, at 1136.
27 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996).2
uld. at 1547 n.32 ("And even if the expression is found to be original, fair use may be
demonstrated by the alleged infringer to defeat the claim of infringement").
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
20 Such costs would include administrative difficulties and lack of predictability. Lotus
I, supra note 14, at 821-22 (Boudin, J., concurring).
2" Of course prior cases and precedent will still control, but copyright policy provides the
best analytical framework for the courts to decide a current case--each analysis is on a case-
by-case basis. Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1343
(5th Cir. 1994); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993).
" Menell, supra note 159, at 1047-48.
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underlie even the most expressive programs and their elements
would make costs of standardization so high that no one could build
on another's ideas.2' 3 Such protection would run directly con-
trary to the constitutional mandate that copyright be used to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."2'"
As the First Circuit noted in Lotus I, building on others' ideas
is central to both copyright and computer programming. 4m
Programs are built from other smaller programs; lots of sub-
programs combine to make one complex program.2" Moreover,
programming is a give and take process. " 7 Programmers com-
monly adopt each other's design elements and ideas for solving
various problems in different contexts. This is evident in the Lotus
case. The idea of a spreadsheet did not originate with Lotus, but
with a creative-but-frustrated MBA student who devised a program
called VisiCalc for help in his personal studies. Lotus was just one
of several spreadsheet programs that followed VisiCalc's lead.243
After that second generation of software, improvements came
quickly. Quattro Pro is a superior program with faster operation,
better graphics, and more capabilities than its predecessors, such
as Lotus 1-2-3.249
All of these advances result from a building process. Program-
ming is based on skilled know-how-like industrial design-
everything derives from an existing idea.2' Although rewarding
the "authors" of these programs is one implicit goal of copyright
law, it is not as vital as encouraging advancement for the better-
ment of society and the general public.2 "1
' Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993).
244 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Lotus I, supra note 14, at 818.
Samuelson et al., supra note 72, at 2326.247 Id. at 2330-31.
2" See Menell, supra note 159, at 1057 (describing creation of spreadsheet software).
' Mike Hogan, Product Outlook: Fresh from the Spreadsheet Oven, PC WORLD, Feb.
1988, at 100-102 (describing improvements in spreadsheet software).
'o Samuelson et al., supra note 72, at 2331. This shows how patent protection appears
to be more appropriate for software. However, many commentators do not like patent law
any more than copyright, especially with the direction copyright has begun to move in post-
Altai times. Others, including Samuelson, advocate a sui generis regime to fit the unique
requirements of the software industry.
"' United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158, 77 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 243
(1948).
[Vol. 4:77
42
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol4/iss1/5
LOTUS V. BORLAND
While patent or a sui generis system of protection might solve
some problems associated with the application of copyright law, the
"use of copyright law has proceeded so far that the basic policy
choice is now irreversible."252 Furthermore, despite declaring
programs to be statutory material, Congress left the adaptation
process to the courts. 253 Thus the courts must strike the balance
between too much and too little protection. The Supreme Court
failed in its duty to contribute its steadying hand to that balancing
process.
Too much legal protection encourages programmers to use non-
compatible methods of expression rather than to improve existing
programs and results in an inefficient use of resources.2 4 Too
little protection may leave all programmers using the same
expression even if better methods might be available, thus causing
software advancement to slow and potentially remain in an inferior
state for some time. 5 Recently, universities funded by govern-
ment and private industry have helped develop newer programs
and programming techniques.' In doing so, these funds allevi-
ate some of the problems with stagnation that arise when less
protection is available.
The Supreme Court should have set a standard whereby broad
copyright protection is rare in computer programs. As the number
of patents granted for software increases, a creator should rely
more heavily on patents for processes and reserve the use of
copyright solely for expression where available. Otherwise, the
easy access to and long duration of copyright would provide
2 Rice, supra note 195, at 1131.
2Id. at 1132.
' Menell, supra note 159, at 1069. Obviously waste cuts against promoting the
advancement of computer software. Judge Keeton, however, focused more on the protective
aspect of copyright law rather than societal/constitutional policies when he observed that
non-copyrightability would allow competitors to emulate a popular interface if the code was
not substantially similar to the original's. Judge Keeton concluded that the law could not
possibly allow such behavior. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Intl, 740 F. Supp. 37,
65-68 (D. Mass. 1990).
2 Menell, supra note 159, at 1070.
1" Id. at 1064.
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unwarranted protection of ideas and functions. 7 The interpreta-
tions given to copyright law in the Whelan era granted creators
unjustified monopoly power over ideas and processes. Most of the
improvements that received protection under copyright would never
have satisfied the novelty and non-obviousness requirements of
patent law. These decisions essentially allowed developers to
circumvent patent law.2 8 When this "forced adaptation" 9 of
copyright law to computers insulates ideas that should be dissemi-
nated to the public, other developers cannot offer the user-friendly
products that consumers desire. Thus Menell advocates a specific
additional requirement that protection not extend to any "user-
friendly" feature designed solely for that purpose.' 0
In failing to lay down firm principles for circuit courts to follow,
the Supreme Court has left those courts free to adopt whatever
policies they see fit, only limited by other well-established princi-
ples. Thus, the debate over the proper scope of copyright protection
remains murky, and threatens to become even murkier.
V. CONCLUSION
Computers continue to grow in popularity. Thus, demand grows
for more sophisticated software to help users perform everyday
tasks. Just like other creators and inventors, software program-
mers and developers want to reap the rewards of their endeavors
and prevent others from profiting by essentially stealing the
creators' ideas and products. Thus, it is important to define the
proper form of protection for software.
The First Circuit, in Lotus v. Borland, took the initial step
toward striking a balance between protection for the developers and
dissemination for the good of the general public. That court
" Amicus Brief, supra note 13, at 33 ("The very fact that such functional ideas are so
valuable explains why copyright law, with its low standards for obtaining protection and its
long duration of exclusive rights, will not protect them"). Although patent has downfalls and
could also stifle the advancement of software, the requirements are more stringent for such
protection, and the duration is much shorter. However, duration is far less of a concern
because software becomes virtually obsolete so quickly.
Menell, supra note 159, at 1096-98.
Rice, supra note 195, at 1136.
2w Menell, supra note 159, at 1099.
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recognized the key issues with respect to copyright protection for
software and attempted to set forth a sound analysis to determine
when copyright should apply. In doing so, the First Circuit reached
the correct result, but not necessarily for the right reasons. The
Supreme Court appeared to recognize the necessity for establishing
those right reasons when it granted certiorari to hear the case.
Alas, the Supreme Court failed to move beyond mere recognition.
Instead of taking a bold step forward into the computer age, the
Court left copyright law in the same state of confusion as it found
it. The circuit courts therefore continue to have no guidance as to
what policies and doctrines should apply. However, there is some
good news for the circuits: no Supreme Court precedent will
impede them when they adopt whatever policies they choose.
BRADLEY W. GROUT
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